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Abstract
In this paper, we use a data-driven approach to predict the ”green potential” of ISCO
occupations based on their corresponding skills. With this information, we can investigate
the relationship between environmental regulations and occupation-level employment in the
manufacturing sector of 19 European countries for the period 1992-2010. Our empirical re-
sults highlight heterogeneous occupational employment changes in response to an increase in
environmental policy stringency. More specifically, we find a decrease in labor demand for
occupations with relatively low green potential and an increase for occupations with relatively
high green potential. Thus, at least in the short term, greening the economy may create
winners and losers across occupations and countries.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, serious concerns about air quality, water pollution, deforestation and, most
importantly, the debate about climate change have led to the implementation of a wide range of
environmental policies in various parts of the world (e.g. command and control-policies, environ-
mental taxes, or pollution permit systems). In Europe, this has resulted in a steady increase of
environmental policy stringency as one can see, for example, by the OECD’s environmental policy
stringency index shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Environmental Policy Stringency in Europe
Note: Environmental policy stringency is calculated as the mean of the OECD environmental policy stringency
index for 19 European countries. The index is described in more detail in the data section of this paper.
Numerous empirical studies have since investigated the effect of environmental policy changes
on employment or on competitiveness and innovation.1 This literature suggests that environmental
policies have had a negligible or even positive net effect on aggregate. However, even if net effects
were estimated to be negligible or slightly positive, there may still be substantial adjustment costs
on more disaggregated levels, e.g., due to structural changes induced by environmental regulations.
Notably, adjustment costs could be particularly relevant for a significant fraction of occupations
(see e.g. Walker, 2013).
Vona et al. (2018) have recently made an important contribution in this regard. Contrary to
previous approaches (e.g. Bowen et al., 2018; Consoli et al., 2016), Vona et al. (2018) focus on
analyzing the demand for ”green skills” rather than on estimating employment shares of green or
1Some contributions focusing on employment include e.g. Marin and Vona (2019); Vona et al. (2018); Isen et al.
(2017); Yamazaki (2017); Walker (2013); Cole and Elliott (2007); Berman and Bui (2001a). In turn e.g. Franco and
Marin (2017); Cai et al. (2011); Berman and Bui (2001b) among others, have primarily investigated the context of
innovation and productivity.
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green rival jobs. In order to identify green skills, they construct skills-based ”greenness”-measures,
which they call ”green general skills” (GGS). These measures are occupation-specific indicators of
how important green skills are in a given occupation. With this, Vona et al. (2018) can then describe
the skill-content of occupations and analyze differences in the skills-sets between occupations. For
the U.S., they show that over the period 2006-2014, environmental regulations had no causal effect
on aggregate manufacturing employment, but raised the demand for green skills. In other words,
they find heterogeneous effects of environmental policies in favor of occupations with a relatively
high number of green skills.
Such heterogeneous effects on the occupation level are of growing concern and are intensively
studied in the recent literature on the effects of technical change. For example, Autor and Dorn
(2013) have shown that computerization has resulted in differential labor market responses on
the occupation level. Specifically, they show that U.S. labor demand has increased not only
for high-skilled occupations but also for low-skilled workers who are employed in manual task
intensive service occupations. In contrast, the demand for low-skilled workers engaged in non-
service occupations with mostly routine tasks has contracted. Autor and Dorn (2013) show that
these heterogeneous responses to structural changes (in the form of routine biased technical change)
had strong distributional consequences between occupations and can well explain the polarization
of the U.S. labor market between 1980 and 2005. Building on this, Goos et al. (2014) have
investigated the phenomenon of job polarization in Europe and confirm that it was also pervasive
in 16 European countries between 1993 and 2010. What both of these authors thus suggest is
that whenever we want to study the effects of structural changes, we should take occupation-level
adjustments into account. And as, for example, Vona et al. (2018) and Martinez-Fernandez et al.
(2010) argue, the green transition can be thought of as an important structural change, triggering
major shifts in the demand for occupations, tasks and skills. However, apart from the analysis of
Vona et al. (2018) with U.S. data, there is little empirical evidence on the effect of this transition
at relatively detailed occupational levels.
This is where our paper contributes to the literature. In particular, we use a data-driven
approach to estimate the ”green potential” of occupations, which we define as their potential to
perform green tasks. We follow Vona et al. (2018) and argue that skills are what matters most
for the green potential. In other words, an occupation that possesses many (few) skills that are
important (unimportant) to perform green tasks, has a high (low) green potential. In particular,
following Rutzer et al. (2020), we use data on skills and tasks from O*NET and train a machine
learning algorithm that relates skills to tasks to estimate the green potential of occupations. We
then use this information to investigate the relationship between environmental regulations and
occupation-level employment in the manufacturing sector of 19 European countries for the period
1992-2010.
Besides Vona et al. (2018), the paper that is most closely related to ours is Marin and Vona
(2019). These authors study employment effects resulting from higher energy prices across macro-
occupational groups in Europe. They find heterogeneity between these occupational groups and
show that technical occupations tend to win, while manual workers seem to lose from higher
energy prices. With our paper, we complement their analysis by focusing on a more detailed level
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of occupations in Europe. Thus, our main contribution to the literature is twofold: First, we
extend Vona et al. (2018)’s skills-based analysis of the U.S. labor market to European occupations
and second, we explicitly investigate heterogeneous labor demand responses from environmental
policies on a relatively disaggregate level. For our empirical analysis, we choose a fixed effects
model, where our outcome variable is occupation-level manufacturing employment and our main
explanatory variable is an index of environmental policy stringency for 19 European countries
between 1992 and 2010. We estimate several model specifications to control for omitted variables
bias and we take into account that differences in environmental policy stringency could, at least
partially, result from country-specific preferences. If these preferences are related to occupational
patterns in the manufacturing sector, our model could suffer from simultaneity concerns. To control
for this possible bias, we also perform an instrumental variable (IV) estimation. Similar to the
approach by Franco and Marin (2017), we use the cross-country average of foreign environmental
policy stringency as an instrument for domestic environmental policy stringency.
For the manufacturing sector, our results indicate that an increase in environmental policy
stringency has on average no significant effect on employment. This finding is consistent with
previous studies (e.g. Vona et al., 2018). However, occupation-specific effects vary substantially
with respect to the green potential of occupations. The higher the green potential of an occupation,
the less negative the effect of environmental policy. For occupations with the highest green potential
values, we estimate positive employment effects. We show that this also translates to heterogeneous
effects of environmental regulations on the country level. Because policy effects vary between
occupations and because the occupational structure between countries differs, countries can be
winners or losers as a result of tighter environmental policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section two illustrates our approach to
identify the green potential of occupations based on skills and tasks. It presents how we empirically
construct a measure for the green potential of ISCO occupations. Section three states our empirical
strategy to estimate the relationship between environmental policy stringency and occupational
employment. Section four describes the data we use for the estimation. In Section five, we start by
descriptively illustrating the relationship between green potential, environmental policy stringency
and employment. Subsequently, we present our empirical results, show robustness checks and
discuss the implication of our results. Section six summarizes the paper, relates our results to the
literature and concludes.
2 The Green Potential of Occupations
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between environmental policies and occupational em-
ployment changes in the manufacturing sector. As a starting point, it is important to note that the
empirical literature concerned with the topic has demonstrated well that environmental policies can
both create and destroy jobs in manufacturing.2 Further, some authors have argued that whether
an occupation is positively, negatively or not at all affected by environmental policies primarily
2The debate on net effects from environmental regulation started at the latest with Porter and van der Linde
(1995). For an overview of the relevant literature see e.g. Vona et al. (2018) or Bowen and Kuralbayeva (2015).
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depends on the skills workers possess (Vona et al., 2018). This is because skills are what matters
most for the potential of an occupation to perform green tasks. In other words, the skill-set of an
occupation defines its green potential, which, in turn, determines whether and how an occupation
is affected by environmental regulation. Therefore, one would expect heterogeneous labor market
responses between occupations.
One mechanism for such employment changes is through shifts in the demand for tasks. More
specifically, as environmental policy becomes more stringent, pollution abatement and energy
saving measures become relatively more attractive for firms. As a result, relative demand for
occupations that possess skills to perform these green tasks increases. An example would be Envi-
ronmental Engineers. According to the O*NET database, a source for job descriptions, their tasks
can include, for example, to ”design pumping systems, pumping stations, pipelines, force mains,
or sewers for the collection of wastewater”. A relative increase in the demand for such green tasks
would then cause heterogeneous labor demand responses to environmental regulations between
occupations. Another possible channel is the task content of the occupations themselves. Occupa-
tions with few or no green tasks could be required to increasingly adapt such tasks. However, this
is only possible if workers have skills that are suited to perform green tasks. If this is the case,
relative labor demand would also increase for occupations that have the necessary skills to adapt
green tasks. An example for such an occupation could be Industrial Production Managers. Again,
according to O*NET, they are currently not explicitly involved in any specific green tasks. How-
ever, they could be in the future and if this were to happen, it would again result in heterogeneous
labor demand effects from environmental policy.3
In order to empirically examine these responses, we need a measure that approximates an
occupation’s potential to perform green tasks based on its skills (i.e. an approximation of its green
potential). The crucial part of this is how to relate skills to green tasks. In principle, there are
numerous possible ways. Vona et al. (2018) were, to the best of our knowledge, the first to propose
a technical approach to the problem. Using data from O*NET, they fit an OLS model to identify a
subset of skills which are important to perform green tasks.4 As the number of important skills is
rather large, they apply principal component analysis (PCA) to group these skills into four different
”greenness measures” which they call ”Green General Skills” (GGS). Subsequently, it is possible
to evaluate the importance of a GGS (i.e. selected green skills) in any given occupation. As their
GGS indices are based on skills that are important for green tasks, they could, in principle, also be
interpreted as a measure of green potential. However, Vona et al. (2018) consider a subset of skills
and they use unweighted averages of these skills for their GGS measures. If we used their GGS
measures as direct approximations for the green potential of occupations, this could be misleading.
Rutzer et al. (2020) propose a different approach by predicting the green potential of occupations
based on their entire skills sets. In doing so, they have trained different machine learning algorithms
and compared their performance. It turned out that the Ridge regression showed the best goodness
3In the long run, there is also a more aggregate structural change that is induced by environmental policy: As
polluting becomes more costly, the relative prices of goods change. However, our empirical approach focuses on
supply side effects of environmental policy stringency in the short run and, therefore, we do not discuss any long
run general equilibrium effects.
4To be more specific, Vona et al. (2018) classify skills with a positive and at the 99% level statistically significant
coefficient as important to perform green tasks.
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of prediction among all trained algorithms, including the GGS proposed by Vona et al. (2018).
Hence, we follow Rutzer et al. (2020) and use the Ridge regression to determine the green potential
of occupations in Europe. In the remainder of this section, we outline the approach in more detail.
Predicting the Green Potential of Occupations
In our analysis, we use occupations that are classified according to the International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The ISCO is a classification system of occupations developed
by the International Labor Organization (ILO). It has been under major revisions over time,
whereas the latest version is ISCO-08. In our analysis, we stick to the previous ISCO nomenclature
of the year 1988 (ISCO-88), as it allows us to consider the largest number of observations for
our empirical analysis. We will come back to this in Section 4. Unfortunately, to the best of
our knowledge, there exists no information about the green potential of occupations classified
according to ISCO-88 (or ISCO-08). However, it is possible to exploit U.S. data provided by
O*NET to estimate the green potential of ISCO occupations.5 In doing so, we proceed in two
steps. In the first step, we use O*NET data to train a model that allows us to predict the green
potential of U.S. SOC occupations. In the second step, we transfer data from SOC to ISCO
occupations and use it as input for the model trained on U.S. data to estimate the green potential
of ISCO occupations. In what follows, we describe the two steps in more detail.
For the first step, two pieces of information from O*NET are of particular interest. The
database contains information on the relative number of green tasks for a total of 966 U.S. occu-
pations. Moreover, for each occupation there exists a fixed list of 114 rather general skills. For
each occupation and skill, the list contains a value for importance and required level that ranges
between 1 (lowest) and 5 or 7 (highest). With these two pieces of information at hand, it is possible
to train machine learning algorithms using the skills from O*NET as explanatory variables (i.e.
features) and the relative number of green tasks as the outcome variable. As mentioned above, we
use the Ridge regression in this paper.
Ridge regression is an estimation method that is capable of handling situations where the data
consists of few observations and many explanatory variables. In such a setting, an OLS model
would usually overfit to the training data. As a result, the prediction accuracy to new data may
be low. In our setting, this is relevant because we are using a rather large number of 114 skills
as explanatory variables. To tackle this problem, the Ridge regression adds a penalty term to the
standard OLS regression equation. The penalty term contains the sum of the squared coefficients
of the input variables multiplied by an endogenously determined constant (see, for example Hastie
et al., 2009). Formally, one obtains the Ridge regression coefficients by minimizing
argmin
β
N∑
i=1
(
yi − β0 −
p∑
s=1
skilli,sβ
ridge
s
)2
+ λridge
p∑
s=1
(βridges )
2,
5O*NET is a database sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor. It contains a huge amount of information
on occupations. We refer interested readers to Dierdorff et al. (2009) for a more detailed description of the O*NET
data used in this paper. Moreover, other work analyzing the green potential of the U.S. labor market also builds
on information from O*NET (Vona et al., 2018; Bowen et al., 2018; Consoli et al., 2016).
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with yi as the outcome variable, which, in our setup, contains the relative number of green tasks.
Moreover, skilli,s contains a skill s and λ
ridge ≥ 0 is the penalty parameter determined later on.
This optimization problem leads to the following coefficients of the Ridge regression:
βˆridge = (X ′X + λridgeI)−1(X ′Y ), (1)
where I is the identity matrix, X the matrix of skill values and Y the vector of the relative
number of green tasks. For λridge = 0, one obtains the standard OLS model. Compared to that,
a positive penalty parameter shrinks the coefficients towards zero, where a larger λridge implies a
stronger shrinkage. This has two effects. First, the shrinkage reduces overfitting to the training
data, and, thus increases generalization to new data. Or in other words, it reduces the probability
of learning too many patterns specific to the training data. At the same time, however, this may
increase the error due to learning an incorrect relationship between input variables and the response
variable. Due to these opposite effects, an increase in λridge leads to a trade-off influencing the
goodness of prediction in either a positive or negative direction. We apply a tenfold cross-validation
to find a value for λridge that leads to the best prediction within our data. This means we randomly
split our O*NET observations into ten similar-sized sets, left the first, second, ..., 10th data set
out and train the model on the remaining nine sets, respectively. Using each left out fold, one
can calculate the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) for each trained model. We repeat these
steps for several different values of λridge and choose the penalty parameter associated with the
lowest MSPE. As usual in machine learning, we use this penalty parameter to train the final model
by considering all observations.
To train the Ridge regression algorithm, we use the previously described data from O*NET.
In particular, we use the relative number of green tasks to all tasks an occupation performs as a
response variable. Moreover, our input variables contain all 114 general skills from O*NET. As
described before, each skill contains a value for importance (IM) and level (LV ). As in Rutzer et al.
(2020), we use both variables in a weighting scheme to calculate the value of a skill s of occupation
i as skilli,s = IM
α
i,sLV
1−α
i,s , with α = 0.7.
6 Moreover, we standardize each occupation’s skill value
by subtracting the skill’s mean and dividing it by the skill’s standard deviation.7
Once the model has been trained, it can be used to predict the green potential of an occupation:
ηˆi = βˆ0 +
p∑
s=1
skilli,sβˆ
ridge
s . (2)
In the next step, we assign skill values to ISCO occupations. It is then possible to predict the
green potential of ISCO occupations using Equation (??).
Several studies confirm that the skills requirements of occupations in the U.S. labor market
are similar to those of comparable occupations in other industrialized countries (OECD, 2017;
6The predicted green potential of occupations remains very robust when varying α in the range of 0 to 1.
7Following common recommendations (see, for example, Hastie et al., 2009), we standardize only the explanatory
variables and leave the response variable unchanged. This means, our response variable is in the range of 0 (no
green task is performed) and 1 (all performed tasks are green).
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CEDEFOP, 2013). Thus, using skills from O*NET and transferring them to ISCO occupations
seems a valid approach. In doing so, we follow the literature (OECD, 2017; Goos et al., 2014) and
transfer the skills step by step from SOC-8 to SOC-6, then to ISCO-08 and finally to ISCO-88. At
each step, we apply a simple average. A detailed explanation of our procedure can be found in the
Appendix A.1. Using the so-obtained skill values as input in Equation (??) allows us to predict the
green potential ηˆi of 3-digit ISCO-88 occupations. As the Ridge regression is a linear estimation
method, predictions can also have negative values. This is not very suitable in the context of
green potential, because an occupation’s potential to perform green tasks should obviously be at
least zero. Rutzer et al. (2020) argue that normalizing all green potential predictions on a 0-1
scale best solves this issue. In a final step, we thus follow this approach and normalize the 3-digit
ISCO-88 predictions from Equation (??). This delivers our final occupation-level indicator of green
potential. Considering all 101 ISCO 3-digit occupations, the mean green potential value is 0.34 and
the standard deviation is 0.21.8 To illustrate, Table 1 states the three manufacturing occupations
with the highest and lowest green potential, respectively. Table 9 in the Appendix reports a full
list of all 3-digit ISCO-88 occupations.
Table 1: Top and Bottom Green Potential Estimates
ISCO Occupation Green Potential
211 Physicists, chemists and related professionals 1.00
214 Architects, engineers and related professionals 0.96
712 Building frame and related trades workers 0.77
... ... ...
414 Library, mail and related clerks 0.08
411 Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks 0.01
422 Client information clerks 0.00
3 Estimating Heterogeneous Labor Market Responses
In the last section we have presented our approach to capture the heterogeneity of occupations
with respect to their green potential. With this data, we can now investigate if demand responses
following environmental policy changes differ among occupations. In what follows, we present
our empirical strategy to estimate such heterogeneous effects. We begin by stating our empirical
model:
log empijt = β1EPSj,t−1 + β2ηˆiEPSj,t−1 + γXj,t−1 + δtrendj + τt + vij + uijt. (3)
In this fixed effects model, log empijt is the log of employment of occupation i in country j at
time t and EPSj,t−1 indicates lagged environmental policy stringency in country j at time t− 1.
Following previous studies investigating effects of environmental policies, we use a one-period lag
for our environmental policy variable (e.g. Franco and Marin, 2017; Leiter et al., 2011; Jaffe and
8In our empirical analysis, some of these occupations drop out of the sample because there are no such jobs in
the manufacturing sector. If considering only those occupations we also use for the empirical analysis, the sample
mean is 0.37 and the standard deviation 0.2.
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Palmer, 1997). This lag structure allows the employment response to occur after some time and,
at the same time, reduces simultaneity concerns (Franco and Marin, 2017; Leiter et al., 2011).9
ηˆi is the occupation-specific measure of green potential estimated with the Ridge regression.
In our empirical setting ηˆi captures the heterogeneity between occupations in terms of their green
potential. Xj,t−1 is a vector of control variables, which takes into account country-level business
cycles, labor force characteristics, trade openness and general technological trends. We follow the
literature and include all control variables with a one-period lag. The variable trendj additionally
controls for country-specific linear time trends and τt are year dummies that control, e.g. for shocks
that are common to all countries. Moreover, vij are occupation-country fixed effects that take into
account occupation-country specific characteristics. For example, vij captures the absolute value
of occupational green potential ηˆi. This is also the reason why Equation 3 does not include a term
βˆ3ηˆi, which would automatically cancel out with vij also being part of the model. Finally, uijt is
the error term of the model.
β1 and β2 are parameters to be estimated to capture the effect of environmental policy strin-
gency. To interpret the two β-coefficients, recall that the green potential measure ηˆi is normalized
among occupations between 0 and 1. Thus, the estimated effect of a one-unit increase in ηˆi con-
ditional on a marginal increase in environmental policy stringency EPSj,t−1 has an interesting
implication: It is identical to comparing the effect of a marginal increase in environmental pol-
icy stringency on the top-ranked green potential occupation (with ηˆt=1) versus the effect on the
bottom-ranked occupation (with ηˆb=0). Thus, β1 states the effect of a marginal increase in envi-
ronmental policy stringency on employment for the bottom-ranked occupation. And adding β2 to
β1 captures the effect on the top-ranked occupation. Hence, β1 and (β1 + β2) indicate the range
of the estimated occupational employment effects. In turn, by setting β2 to zero and estimating
Equation (3) again, β1 captures the average effect of environmental policy across all occupations.
Our empirical specification may suffer from various identification problems. One concern is
omitted variables bias, which is always an issue when working with observational data. Omitted
variable bias would distort our empirical results if variables existed which affect occupational
employment, are correlated with our main explanatory variable EPSj,t−1 and are unobserved or
not sufficiently controlled for in our regression model. A fixed effects model reduces this concern
to some extent, because it automatically takes into account all potentially distorting variables
that do not vary over time (i.e. vij in Equation 3). Such fixed effects are, for example, the
general offshorability or routine task intensity of occupations. In addition to controlling for such
fixed effects, we also include time trends and a wide range of control variables into our model.
Finally, we explicitly investigate some potential sources of omitted variable bias in more detail in
a sensitivity analysis.
A second problem of our model is that it could suffer from reverse causality. Reverse causality
could be an issue if occupational patterns in the manufacturing sector have an effect on country-
level environmental regulations. This could, for example, be the case through political preferences
or lobbying. At first sight this scenario does not seem to be a major issue, because our model
9As a test to the sensitivity of our main results, we have also estimated our empirical model with alternative
lags. This did not change our empirical findings. The results from these alternative estimations can be found in
Table 17 in the Appendix.
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features employment on the occupation level and not on the industry level. Hence, it seems
rather unlikely that occupation-level employment changes (e.g. employment changes for ”machine
operators” in the manufacturing sector) directly influence national environmental regulations. In
contrast, measuring employment at the industry level would make reverse causality, e.g. through
lobbying, a much bigger threat to the validity of our estimates. Moreover, all of our explanatory
variables are included in the model with a one-period lag. For simultaneity to occur, future
occupational employment changes would have to affect current environmental policies. Because
occupational groups could anticipate future employment effects and thus influence the current
political process, this is not impossible. However, the problem is somewhat reduced by the lag
structure of our model. Nevertheless, we additionally use an instrumental variable approach to
further address simultaneity concerns. In doing so, we use average foreign environmental policy
stringency as an instrument for domestic policy stringency. This is a similar approach as, e.g.
in Franco and Marin (2017). These authors investigate the effect of environmental policy on
innovation and productivity. In order to estimate causal effects of policy changes on productivity,
they instrument a sector’s patent stock by using the average patent stock of the same sectors
in foreign countries as well as the average patent stock of other domestic sectors.10 Regarding
the validity of our instrument, our main assumption for the exclusion restriction to hold is that
occupation-level employment patterns are only affected by the foreign level of environmental policy
stringency through domestic policy stringency (e.g. through international agreements). In other
words, e.g. domestic preferences and lobbying are assumed to have no effect on average foreign
environmental policy stringency. Given this assumption, instruments for environmental policy in
country k at time t can be constructed as the mean of all other N − 1 countries’ environmental
policy stringency:
EPSIVkt =
1
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
EPSjt ∀ j 6= k. (4)
Using EPSIVjt as an instrument for EPSjt in Equation (3) allows us to re-estimate our model
with an instrumental variable approach.
4 Data
In this section we provide an overview of the data we use to estimate our empirical model. We
begin by describing the data on environmental policy stringency. We then turn to the data on
occupation-level manufacturing employment, which is our outcome variable of interest. Lastly, we
present information on the variables that we use as controls.
Environmental Policy
As for any empirical study assessing quantitatively the effects of environmental regulations, a key
challenge is to find some exogenously determined measure of environmental policy stringency. For
10Similar approaches have also been used to construct instrumental variables for exposure to foreign trade (Autor
et al., 2013) or exposure to robots (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).
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the U.S., many studies have used the Clean Air Act (CAA) and its amendments (CAAA) (see
e.g. Vona et al., 2018; Isen et al., 2017; Chay and Greenstone, 2003; Greenstone, 2002). Unfor-
tunately, similar policy experiments are hard to find in Europe. Therefore, studies on European
environmental regulations have to resort to a more general approach to measure environmental
stringency. For example, Cole and Elliott (2007) focus on environmental protection expenditure,
Franco and Marin (2017) on environmental taxes and, more recently, Marin and Vona (2019)
use energy prices. In our analysis, we use the OECD’s recently developed environmental policy
stringency (EPS) index (Botta and Koz´luk, 2014). This indicator has already been used in some
empirical studies on environmental regulations (see e.g. Marin and Vona, 2019; Verdolini et al.,
2018; Albrizio et al., 2017). One of its main advantages is that it allows a comparison of environ-
mental policy stringency on the international level over a relatively long period of time. At the
same time, the EPS aggregates a wide range of environmental policies and does not focus on a very
specific policy intervention. This also means that all of our empirical findings are estimated with
respect to the overall green regulatory stringency and not with regard to some clearly identified
and unique policy introduction.
The EPS index is a composite indicator constructed from a set of environmental policies that
explicitly or implicitly raise the cost of polluting or environmentally harmful behaviour (Botta and
Koz´luk, 2014). The included policy instruments range, e.g. from emission trading schemes for CO2
to SOx emission limits and industry taxes on diesel. With this broad approach, the EPS index
allows an approximation of the multi-dimensionality of environmental policy. From a technical
point of view, the index is constructed along the following lines: First, the stringency of every
national policy instrument at any point in time (e.g. SOx emission limits in Germany in the year
2002) is defined using a cardinal measure of 7 classes. Each class receives a scoring value, which
ranges from 0 (non-existent) to 6 (most stringent). For every policy instrument, the boundaries of
these seven classes are then defined, based on the full sample distribution of the policy instrument
in question. For example, an emission limit value (ELV) for NOx between 200 and 250 mg/nm
3
is assigned to the 5th class. This class has a scoring value of 4, i.e. an ELV of 220mg/nm3
would receive a policy stringency value of 4. In other words, the more stringent a specific policy
instrument is in relative terms, the higher its EPS. By averaging the scoring values of different
policy instruments, one obtains the EPS index. In fact, there are several EPS sub-indicators for
different levels of aggregation. For our analysis, we choose the fully specified EPS index on the
country-level, because it best approximates the broad range of policies which is inherent to a green
transition.11
Over the next section of this paper, we present our regression results and additionally illustrate
employment responses from a specific regulatory shock. In order to derive and quantify such a
policy shock, we will use the distribution of the EPS index, instead of just choosing an arbitrary
figure. In particular, we use the following definitions: We define EPSj,. as the country-level average
EPS index over time and EPS.,. as the mean of all EPSj,.. Notation-wise, a dot in the subscript
indicates the dimension(s) on which we average over. Formally:
11For information on all the policy instruments included in this EPS specification, see Botta and Koz´luk (2014).
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EPSj,. =
1
T
T∑
t=1
EPSj,t (5)
EPS.,. =
1
J
J∑
j=1
EPSj,. = 1.9 (6)
To describe the evolution of the EPS index, we similarly define ∆EPSj,. as a country-level average
of EPS-changes over time and ∆EPS.,. as the mean of all country-level average EPS-changes:
∆EPSj,. =
( T∏
t=2
EPSj,t
EPSj,t−1
) 1
T−1
− 1 (7)
∆EPS.,. =
1
J
J∑
j=1
∆EPSj,. = 0.0691 (8)
The initial values EPSj,1 and, especially, the evolution of the EPS, is heterogeneous across
countries.12 This is clearly shown in Figure 2, which plots ∆EPSj,. i.e. the country-level average
of EPS-changes over time. It is interesting to see that the three Eastern European countries of
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have witnessed the largest average changes over the
sample period ranging from 1992-2010. This could be due to their accession to the European Union
in 2004, which could have triggered many regulatory shocks in these countries. In turn, countries
like Germany, Denmark or Switzerland, which already had a rather high initial environmental
policy stringency in our sample, did not experience large EPS-changes on average. Thus, regarding
the validity of our estimates, it will be important to consider if estimated policy effects are driven
solely by the evolution of environmental policy stringency of specific countries.
Employment
For the number of employed persons in different occupations and countries, we use data from the
European Labor Force Survey (ELFS) from Eurostat. The representative survey has been con-
ducted since 1983 in all EU member states, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland by the respective
domestic statistical offices and harmonized by Eurostat. The data is widely used for different pur-
poses. For example, Eurostat uses the data for their employment and unemployment figures of
European countries. Moreover, the data has also been used in various scientific publications (see,
for example, Gregory et al., 2018; Goos et al., 2014, 2009). For this paper, we use the data to
calculate the number of persons of a country employed in a particular occupation and industry on
a yearly base. In particular, we use occupations categorized according to ISCO-88. This allows
us to consider data from 1992 to 2010 of the ELFS. If instead we used the latest revision of the
ISCO, namely ISCO-08, the data would be available for the period 2011-2016 only. Hence, by
using ISCO-88 it is possible to consider a much longer time period. Moreover, in order to have as
many different occupations as possible, we take only those countries into account that report the
12Note that the range of our sample varies slightly among countries. Table 10 in the Appendix presents summary
statistics as well as the time range for the EPS index of every country in our estimation sample.
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Figure 2: Average environmental policy stringency changes over time
Note: The country-level averages ∆EPSj,. are calculated as the geometric mean of EPS-changes over time. The
data is from the OECD and covers the period 1992 to 2010. European countries, which are not part of our
analysis, are colored in gray.
employment numbers on a 3-digit ISCO level, which is the most disaggregated level available in
the ELFS. All other countries are excluded.13 Moreover, as in Vona et al. (2018), we consider only
employment in the manufacturing industry. In sum, our analysis considers data for a maximum
of 66 different occupations in the manufacturing sector of the following 19 European countries:
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the
UK.14
Control Variables
Apart from environmental policy, various other economic and demographic trends could have an ef-
fect on occupational employment. Important drivers could be, for example, the occupation-specific
routine task intensity or offshorability, technological trends like digitalization and robotization, as
well as the business cycle and trade, just to name a few. Our empirical model takes this into
account, as it explicitly incorporates a set of control variables for such trends. More specifically,
we control for the national unemployment rate, trade openness (measured as the logged share of
the sum of exports and imports over GDP), technological change and human capital (measured
13In addition, we have excluded countries that only reported employment figures for relatively few occupations.
This was the case for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg.
14Table 11 in the Appendix reports the number of ISCO 3-digit occupations per country used for our empirical
analysis.
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as the log of total patents invented by domestic residents), the female labor force participation
rate, the demographic structure of an economy (measured by the ratio of persons of working age
(15-64) to pension age (+65)), the size of the manufacturing sector (measured as the log of total
manufacturing employment) and the population size (measured as the log of total population).
Summary statistics on all these control variables can be found in Table 12 in the Appendix.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we first present our estimation results and subsequently show corresponding ro-
bustness checks. Before concluding, we highlight possible employment responses following an
environmental policy shock and discuss the implication of our results.
As a starting point to our empirical analysis, we first provide some descriptive correlations
about the potential relationship of environmental policy, employment and green potential. Figure
3 relates the three dimensions to each other. In particular, it plots the country-level averages of
occupational employment changes over time ∆empij,. (in %) relative to the country-level averages of
EPS-changes over time ∆EPSj,. (in %), whereas the latter are weighted by the green potential of
occupations ηˆi. The blue line is the fitted linear relationship between the two variables and the
color of the points indicates the green potential of occupations. The figure suggests a positive
Figure 3: Green potential, environmental policy stringency and employment
Note: Country-level average changes ∆EPSj,. and ∆
emp
ij,.
are calculated as the geometric mean of annual changes in
the EPS index and occupational employment levels, respectively. ∆EPSj,. is weighted by the green potential of
occupations ηˆi. The data on environmental policy is from the OECD and that on occupational employment from
Eurostat. The data covers the period 1992-2010.
relationship between changes in occupational employment and environmental policy stringency
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weighted by green potential. In general, occupations with a lower green potential, which are
colored darker in Figure 3, seem to experience smaller or even negative employment changes
compared to those with higher green potential. Thus, this descriptive correlation suggests that
a causal relationship, as it has been documented by Vona et al. (2018) for the U.S., could also
be present in Europe. Of course, there are many other factors that simultaneously influence
occupational employment changes and could drive the relationship presented in Figure 3. Thus,
our empirical model stated in Equation (3) incorporates several control variables to reduce such
threats from omitted variable bias. In the next subsection, we present estimation results from
various specifications of our empirical model.
Main Results
We first discuss our empirical results of a fixed effects regression of the model specified in Equation
(3). The results are presented in Table 2. The two coefficients on environmental policy estimate the
linear relationship of a one-unit increase in the EPS index on the bottom-ranked and top-ranked
green potential occupation, respectively.15 The coefficient in column (4) is an exception, as it states
the average effect on employment across all occupations. All model specifications are estimated
using a within transformation to control for time-invariant fixed effects on the occupation-country
level (i.e. fixed and unobserved characteristics of occupations in a given country). Standard errors
are clustered at the occupation-country level and are robust against heteroskedasticity.16
In column (1) we estimate the model without any control variables. This yields two highly
significant coefficients for both the top- and bottom-ranked green potential occupation. For the
bottom-ranked occupation, we estimate a negative and for the top-ranked occupation a positive
employment response. These coefficients highlight the employment effect associated with a one-
unit increase in the EPS index. In order to illustrate and discuss occupational employment changes,
we use an average EPS-change. To derive it, recall the definitions from Section 4: ∆EPS.,. = 0.069
or 6.9% is the mean of country-level averages of EPS-changes over time. Similarly, EPS.,. = 1.9 is
the mean of country-level averages of EPS levels over time. Based on this, an average EPS-change
across countries can be approximated by ∆EPS.,. × EPS.,. = 0.069× 1.9 = 0.131. Multiplying this
figure by the βˆ-coefficients from column (1) implies the following: In response to an average EPS-
change by 0.131, employment decreases by 3.1% for the bottom-ranked occupation and increases
by 2.0% for the top-ranked occupation, respectively.17 However, this model specification only
controls for occupation-country specific effects that do not vary over time (e.g. the routine task
intensity or the offshorability of occupations). Therefore, the estimates are likely to suffer from
omitted variable bias resulting from, e.g. general economic conditions and structural trends.
15We have also estimated a model that includes the square of the EPS index as an explanatory variable. Using
such a specification results in the same estimated relationship as it is discussed over the following sections. However,
point estimates vary and generally become larger in absolute size compared to the pure linear relationship. At the
same time, standard errors increase and the relationship becomes less stable.
16Coefficients and standard errors on all included variables in the model specifications presented in Table 2 can
be found in Table 13 in the Appendix
17For the bottom-ranked occupation, we derive the employment response by calculating βˆ1 × 0.131 = −0.236 ×
0.131 = 0.031 or 3.1%. Similarly, for the top-ranked occupation, we calculate βˆ1 × 0.131 + βˆ2 × 0.131 = (−0.236 ×
0.131) + (0.391 × 0.131) = 0.020 or 2.0%.
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Table 2: Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Employment (Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.015)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.391∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.058) (0.057) (0.065)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X
Country time trends X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X
Observations 11,543 11,123 11,123 11,123
R2 0.046 0.072 0.113 0.105
Adjusted R2 −0.018 0.007 0.050 0.041
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010.
The dependent variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. All model specifications
include fixed effects for country-specific occupations. Columns (2) to (4) further include year dummies,
country-specific linear time trends and a set of control variables. More specifically, columns (2) to (4)
include the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the
logged patent stock invented by domestic residents to control for the business cycle as well as trends in
trade and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working
age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate,
the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. In columns (3) and (4)
the trade and technology control variables from column (2) are additionally interacted with the green
potential measure ηˆi, thereby constructing two new controls on the occupation level. Moreover, columns
(3) and (4) incorporate a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of country-specific occupations (721 country-specific ISCO 3-digit occupations)
and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
To address this issue, we add in column (2) year dummies, country-level time trends and
seven control variables. Three of the control variables embody general economic trends. More
precisely, they control for changes in the national unemployment rate, changes in a country’s
openness to foreign trade (measured as the logged share of the sum of imports and exports on
GDP) and in its total patent stock (measured as the log of the total number of patents invented
by its residents). The four remaining control variables address omitted variable bias, which could
result from country-level demographic dynamics or trends that are specific to the manufacturing
sector. An important issue could, for example, be migration flows resulting from more stringent
environmental policies in some specific countries. To address such trends, we add the share of the
working age population (16-64 years old) relative to the share of pensioners (65+ years old) as a
proxy for the age structure of an economy and we also include the female labor force participation
rate. Further, we include the log of the country’s population and the log of total manufacturing
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employment. Controlling for year dummies, time trends and these seven control variables decreases
the coefficient on the bottom-ranked occupation in column (2) but leaves the top-ranked occupation
practically unaffected. Also, both coefficients remain highly significant and have the same sign as
before.18
As a further step to control for omitted variable bias, we include interactions of the trade and
technology control variables with our green potential measure ηˆi in the model specification in col-
umn (3). This allows us to take into account the possibility of heterogeneous trade and technology
shocks. What comes to mind are, e.g. the enlargement of the European Union or computerization
as a technological trend. If such shocks have not only had an average effect on occupational employ-
ment (as modelled in column 2) but have also affected occupations similarly as has environmental
policy, this would result in omitted variable bias. The two interactions control for this concern. In
addition, we further include linear time trends that differ between macro-occupational groups (i.e.
between ISCO 1-digit groups). Using such trends can control for underlying technological changes
that differently affect macro-occupational groups (e.g. ”Professionals” vs. ”Clerical support work-
ers”). As one can see in column (3), including these new control variables does somewhat alter the
regression estimates. Both coefficients on environmental policy slightly decrease in size but remain
highly significant.
Regarding the employment response following an average EPS-change of 0.131, our full model
specification in column (3) now estimates slightly different results: Occupational employment
responses now range from a 1.8% decrease for the bottom-ranked occupation to a 2.6% increase
for the top-ranked occupation. This means that after controlling for various confounding factors,
we still find substantial heterogeneity between occupations.
What this suggests is that considering the heterogeneity of occupations in terms of their green
potential provides a nuanced view on employment effects resulting from increased environmental
policy stringency. This can best be demonstrated by looking at the coefficient on environmental
policy in column (4). In this model specification, there is no heterogeneity between occupations.
Rather, the model estimates an average effect across all occupations. Different to the previous
estimation results, the estimated coefficient in column (4) is clearly non-significant. Moreover,
the size of the coefficient is very small. This is because there is a relatively large number of
occupations with rather low green potential and negligible employment responses. If we again
consider the employment response of an average EPS-change by 0.131, not taking into account
any heterogeneity between occupations, our estimates from column (4) would imply a decrease of
occupational employment by −0.009 ∗ 0.131 = −0.001 or −0.1%. However, because the coefficient
in column (4) is not significantly different from zero, we cannot even exclude that occupational
employment on average does not react at all. In general, this is in line with previous studies that
have measured negligible or non-existent effects from environmental policy on employment (see
e.g. Vona et al., 2018). But this view could be too narrow. As our empirical results in columns
(1)-(3) highlight, there are occupations which could witness substantial employment gains or losses
from increased environmental policy stringency.
However, this finding hinges on our green potential measure ηˆi, which we have constructed
18We perform additional sensitivity tests in the next section. For example, we focus on specific countries and
sub-sample regressions to check for potentially omitted trends.
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from the data. Thus, ηˆi is an estimate of green potential and we want to test if we indeed capture
important information with it. In order to test this, we have randomly assigned green potential
values to all occupations and have then re-estimated our fully specified regression model (i.e. we
have estimated a ”placebo regression”). If green potential is indeed important and our measure
captures it well, then the random assignment of ηˆi should make the regression coefficients non-
significant. In our placebo regression, this is the case (estimation results can be found in Table
18 in the Appendix). The results from this test are reassuring that our green potential measure
ηˆi does capture important information of occupations and is suitable for analyzing our research
question.
Table 3: Instrument Relevance (Fixed Effects Estimation)
Dependent variable:
Domestic Environmental Policy
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign Environmental Policy 0.868∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.151) (0.164)
Country fixed effects X X X
Time trend X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X
Demographic & sector controls X
Weak instrument Wald test (F-Value) 46.3 25.0 23.5
Observations 324 324 311
R2 0.804 0.817 0.820
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.803 0.803
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between
1992 and 2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the domestic environmental
policy stringency index. All model specifications include fixed effects for 19 countries and
a common linear time trend. Columns (2) and (3) also include a set of control variables.
Business cycle, trade and technology controls consist of the national unemployment rate,
the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the logged patent stock invented by
domestic residents. Demographic and sector controls include the following: First, the ratio
between the population share of the working age population (16-65 years old) to pensioners
(65+ years old), then the female labor force participation rate as well as the log of the
national population and the log of total manufacturing employment. Standard errors
are clustered at country-level (19 countries) and are robust against heteroskedasticity.
Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
So far, we have estimated several model specifications to address problems of omitted vari-
able bias. As we pointed out in Section 3, another concern of our estimation strategy is reversed
causality. We thus re-estimate our model using an instrumental variable approach. As described in
Section 3, we use average foreign environmental policy stringency as an instrument for our poten-
tially endogenous variable of domestic environmental policy stringency. We have argued that the
exclusion restriction holds if average foreign environmental policy stringency only affects domestic
employment patterns through domestic environmental policy stringency. This assumption cannot
be tested empirically. In turn, what can be investigated is the relevance of our instrument. If an
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instrument is not a relevant instrument, it is considered a ”weak instrument”, which leads to biased
estimates (see, for example, Bound et al., 1995). As a rule of thumb, a relevant instrument should
have an F-value above 10 in the first stage, i.e. it should explain an important part of the variation
in the potentially endogenous variable. In our case, this means that average foreign environmental
policy stringency should appropriately explain domestic environmental policy stringency. We test
this with different model specifications for the relationship between the two variables in Table 3.
As specified in Equations (3) and (4), environmental policy stringency is measured on the country
level and, therefore, the relationship between foreign and domestic policy stringency is now also
estimated on the country level. It is reassuring that weak instruments tests show F-values that are
much larger than 10 in all the different model specifications shown in Table 3. This indicates that
we can reject the hypothesis that foreign environmental policy stringency is only a weak instrument
for domestic environmental policy stringency.19
In what follows, we proceed with our IV-approach and re-estimate the model specifications
from Table 2 using average foreign environmental policy stringency as an instrument for domestic
environmental policy stringency. The corresponding results are presented in Table 4. As before,
the coefficients imply substantial heterogeneity with respect to the green potential of occupations.
In column (1)-(3) of Table 4, both the coefficients on the bottom- and the top-ranked occupation
are highly significant and of larger size than before. This indicates that our previous fixed effects
estimates could have been biased by reverse causality. One potential mechanism explaining this
could be political lobbying. Take, for example, occupational groups, who are relatively likely to
suffer from more stringent regulations. If they anticipate this negative effect, they will lobby
against too stringent environmental policies. This, in turn, would result in weaker regulations and
thereby cause reverse causality in a fixed effects model framework. The IV-approach is robust
against such sources of bias, and we will thus use the results from this approach in the remainder
of this paper.20
As in the previous fixed effects estimation, the coefficient on the bottom-ranked occupation
from the IV model decreases in column (2). In this specification, the model controls for country-
specific general economic conditions (i.e. the business cycle, trade and technological trends) and
sectoral as well as demographic trends. This suggests that controlling for country-specific trends
is still important when using an IV approach. The coefficient on the top-ranked occupation (i.e.
the coefficient on the interaction term), in turn, remains more or less unaffected by the inclusion
of these control variables. Going one step further to column (3), both coefficients now remain very
stable and do not seem to be overly sensitive to including ISCO 1-digit trends and interaction
terms.
19In addition, Table 14 in the Appendix provides a robustness check to the exogeneity assumption of our in-
strument. As we have argued, the instrument would not be valid if, for example, domestic employment patterns
influence multilateral negotiations on environmental issues, which, in turn, affect average foreign environmental
policy. Clearly, this threat to the validity of our instrument is more relevant for larger and politically more powerful
countries. We thus exclude the G7 member countries of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom from our
sample and re-estimate the model from Table 3. It is reassuring that the estimation results from this sub-sample
do not change substantially, which indicates that our instruments should be robust against the above-mentioned
validity concerns.
20Following the rationale outlined in Footnote 19, we have also estimated all regression specifications from Table
4 without including G7 member countries. As for the first stage, the estimates from this sub-sample regression
remain practically unchanged (see Table 16 in the Appendix).
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Table 4: Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Employment (IV Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.292∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.033) (0.030) (0.039) (0.015)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.460∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.069) (0.067) (0.093)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X
Country time trends X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X
Observations 11,543 11,123 11,123 11,123
R2 0.045 0.071 0.112 0.105
Adjusted R2 −0.018 0.006 0.049 0.041
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010.
The dependent variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. All model specifications
include fixed effects for country-specific occupations. Columns (2) to (4) further include year dummies,
country-specific linear time trends and a set of control variables. More specifically, columns (2) to (4)
include the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the
logged patent stock invented by domestic residents to control for the business cycle as well as trends in
trade and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working
age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate,
the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. In columns (3) and (4)
the trade and technology control variables from column (2) are additionally interacted with the green
potential measure ηˆi, thereby constructing two new controls on the occupation level. Moreover, columns
(3) and (4) incorporate a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of country-specific occupations (721 country-specific ISCO 3-digit occupations)
and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In the baseline model specification presented in column (3), the estimated employment change
associated with an increase in environmental policy stringency by 0.131 on the bottom-ranked
occupation is now −0.189 ∗ 0.131 = −0.025, i.e. an employment decrease of 2.5%. On the other
hand, employment is expected to increase by −0.189 ∗ 0.131 + 0.462 ∗ 0.131 = −0.036 or −3.6% for
the top-ranked occupation. Our IV regression therefore suggests even stronger heterogeneous labor
demand responses from environmental policy changes. As before, we also report an estimate for
the average effect across all occupations in column (4). In contrast to the specifications in columns
(1)-(3), where heterogeneity between occupations is modelled, the size and significance level of the
coefficient on environmental policy stringency in column (4) is practically identical to the previous
fixed effects model results. In particular, the coefficient is non-significant. The implied average
employment response resulting from an EPS-change by 0.131 is 0.131 ∗ (−0.010) = 0.001, which
corresponds to a decrease of employment by 0.1% and can be considered non-existent.
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So far, we have investigated the relationship between environmental policy stringency and
employment. Our empirical findings suggest substantial heterogeneity between occupations and,
accordingly, there will be winners and losers from increased environmental policy stringency. In
the next subsections, we will examine the sensitivity of this finding and illustrate employment
responses following an environmental policy shock at the aggregate level.
Sensitivity Analysis
We start with a robustness check that additionally controls for omitted variable bias resulting
from globalization and technological trends. We consider these trends to be the most relevant
potential confounders for our baseline estimates.21 In our baseline IV regression, we have included
several control variables for the purpose of taking into account such structural trends. Thus, we
expect our baseline IV-model specification to substantially reduce threats of omitted variable bias.
However, despite the inclusion of these control variables, some concerns remain. If, for example,
all of our control variables do not adequately capture actual globalization and technological trends,
our estimates could still be biased. The same could occur if the EPS index is highly correlated with
globalization and technological trends. Thus, we want to test our findings against this potential
threat to the validity of our results.
In order to do so, we split our sample into groups of occupations that should be similarly
affected by technological trends and globalization, respectively. Because of the similarity, there
should no longer be substantial heterogeneity resulting from technology or globalization trends
within these occupational groups. In our regression model, the coefficient β2 in Equation (3) (i.e.
the coefficient on the top-ranked occupation) captures heterogeneity between occupations. Thus,
if our baseline results suffer from omitted variable bias, this coefficient should become smaller and
non-significant when separately estimating the model for the different groups. Stated differently,
if such regressions lead to similar coefficients compared to our baseline estimates, our results can
be considered relatively robust against omitted variable bias from globalization and technological
trends.
The first step of this robustness check is to determine groups of similar occupations. In order
to do so, we follow Goos et al. (2014), who provide information on the routine task intensity and
offshorability of 2-digit ISCO occupations.22 Ordering occupations along these two characteristics
allows us to construct occupational groups for each measure. We construct three groups, each
consisting of 6 or 7 2-digit ISCO occupations with ”high”, ”middle” and ”low” exposure to tech-
nological trends and offshoring, respectively.23 We then run our baseline IV model on the three
21This is motivated by Marin and Vona (2019) and extensive literature which suggests that routine biased technical
change and globalization have both affected occupations heterogeneously. Some important contributions are Goos
et al. (2014) Autor and Dorn (2013), Autor et al. (2013) and, more recently, Gregory et al. (2018).
22More specifically, Goos et al. (2014) use the routine task intensity index (RTI) developed by Autor and Dorn
(2013) as a measure of exposure to technological trends and the offshorability index from Blinder and Krueger (2013)
for exposure to globalization. They transfer these measures to 2-digit ISCO occupations. The data is available in
the online Appendix from Goos et al. (2014).
23As occupations in our analysis are on the 3-digit ISCO level, we assign them to the routine task intensity
and offshorability groups of their respective 2-digit ISCO groups. For example, the 3-digit ISCO occupation, ”122
Production and operations managers”, belongs to the 2-digit ISCO group ”12 Corporate managers”. This particular
2-digit group has a low routine task intensity in Goos et al. (2014) and we have thus classified it to the ”low RTI”
group. Accordingly, ”122 Production and operations managers” are also assigned to this class of occupations.
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groups separately. As argued before, if our previous results were driven by omitted variable bias,
we should no longer see substantial heterogeneity within these groups. In turn, if we still observe
heterogeneous employment responses from environmental policy stringency, this would suggest that
our findings are indeed primarily driven by environmental policy stringency. Note, however, that
it is impossible to construct perfectly homogeneous groups with regard to technology and glob-
alization. As a result, the heterogeneity (and its corresponding regression coefficient) would not
vanish completely (i.e. become zero), even if the baseline estimates were entirely driven by omit-
ted variables. Nevertheless, the regression coefficient capturing heterogeneity should still strongly
decrease in this case. The regression results for each group are presented in Table 5. Columns (1)
to (3) present the estimates for the three groups and column (4) shows the IV-estimates from our
baseline model.
Our previous findings should be robust against omitted variable bias resulting from trade or
technology if the coefficient of the term {Environmental policyt−1 × green potential} does not
substantially change in the subgroup regressions. In our baseline IV-regression, this coefficient
was 0.462. We first compare this estimate with the three RTI groups in the upper half of Table 5.
Interestingly, the coefficient increases in size for the high RTI group in column (1). One explanation
for this is the occupational composition of the high-RTI group. In Goos et al. (2014), occupations
with high RTI are either technical or administrative jobs. In our estimates of the green potential of
occupations, however, we have observed that technical occupations have rather high green potential
and administrative occupations are ranked at lower positions of the distribution. Thus, this group
features a wide range of occupations in terms of green potential. And what follows from this is
that the heterogeneity increases compared to the full sample estimates. In turn, the coefficient
decreases for the middle and low RTI groups in columns (2) and (3). However, the decrease is not
very large and the coefficient remains positive and highly significant in all subgroup regressions.
In the lower half of Table 5, we repeat the procedure for the offshorability groups. Column (1)
presents results for occupations that are highly offshorable. For this group, we observe declining
heterogeneity, which is different compared to the RTI case. However, the decrease of the coeffi-
cients is very small and we consider it negligible compared to the baseline estimate in column (4).
In column (2), in turn, the heterogeneity decreases drastically. The coefficient on the interaction
term of our model decreases from 0.462 in the baseline model to only 0.025 in column (2). Further,
it becomes clearly non-significant and, at the same time, the coefficient on environmental policy
without the interaction also becomes very small and non-significant. This indicates that occupa-
tions from this group seem to be unaffected by environmental policy in general. Accordingly, there
is also no heterogeneity. In other words, the lack of occupational heterogeneity within the middle
offshorable group of occupations seems to stem from the fact that in this group many occupations
are unaffected by environmental policy. However, this finding is specific to the middle offshorability
group. For the low offshorable group presented in column (3), we again observe a similar pattern
as we did for the high-RTI class. The heterogeneity in this group even increases compared to the
baseline estimates.
In sum, in five of our six sub-group regressions, we observe results which suggest that our
baseline estimates are not biased by omitted variables. Therefore, we conclude that our findings
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Table 5: Environmental Policy, Routine Task Intensity and Offshorability (IV Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
high RTI middle RTI low RTI baseline
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.179∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.196∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.086) (0.087) (0.039)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.559∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.144) (0.189) (0.136) (0.093)
Observations 5,831 3,263 1,993 11,123
R2 0.120 0.076 0.174 0.112
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.000 0.097 0.049
(1) (2) (3) (4)
high middle low baseline
offshorability offshorability offshorability
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.136∗∗∗ −0.037 −0.282∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.086) (0.103) (0.039)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.415∗∗∗ 0.025 0.602∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.119) (0.185) (0.222) (0.093)
Observations 5,757 3,348 1,982 11,123
R2 0.169 0.123 0.113 0.112
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.051 0.029 0.049
Country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Country time trends X X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X X X
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. The regression model in all columns includes fixed
effects for country-specific occupations, year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and a set of control
variables. More specifically, the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP
and the logged patent stock invented by domestic residents control for the business cycle as well as trends in
trade and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working age (16-64
years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate, the log of the total
population and the log of total manufacturing employment. Moreover, the trade and technology control variables
are additionally interacted with the green potential measure ηˆi, which provides two additional control variables on
the occupation level. Lastly, the model incorporates a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the level of country-specific occupations and are robust against heteroskedasticity.
Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
are not driven solely by technological trends or globalization.
Next, we turn to a somewhat related cause of concern, which is that our findings could be
primarily driven by a very specific sub-period. To investigate this, we split our sample into three
sub-samples, each consisting of six or seven years. The first sub-sample ranges from 1992-1998
(we assign 7 years to this period because it has the lowest number of observations), the second
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from 1999-2004 and the last one from 2005-2010. Note that the evolution of the EPS index
differs among these three sub-periods (see Figure 1) and, accordingly, we expect to find different
parameter estimates when we run the baseline IV-regressions on the three sub-samples. The results
are presented in columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 and in column (4), we again report the baseline
IV-estimates. Compared to the baseline regression, the results from the sub-periods 2005-2010
and 1999-2004 in columns (1) and (2) are relatively similar, especially for the bottom-ranked
occupations. In fact, the coefficient on the bottom-ranked occupation is larger than in the baseline
regression, which suggests that later years of our sample are mainly driving the baseline results. In
contrast, the estimated coefficients for the sub-period 1992-1998 presented in column (3) decrease
in size and the relationship breaks down since the coefficients’ standard errors become very large.
Note, however, that over these years, the EPS index hardly moved at all. Thus, we would also
expect no occupational employment responses. Therefore, it is reassuring to find no significant
employment responses when the EPS index did not change substantially. In summary, we find
evidence that the estimated relationship from the baseline IV-regression does not stem from an
unobserved general trend. Moreover, the relationship is mainly driven by later periods in our
sample.
Thus far, we have investigated two different sources of bias, which could arise from our model
specification. Next, we turn to examining if the baseline IV-results could have been driven by
large outliers in our sample. In order to test this, we again re-estimate our baseline IV-model from
column (3) in Table 4. But now we exclude those observations from our sample for which the main
explanatory variable lies within the top 0.5% (i.e. the interaction of environmental policy EPSj,t
and green potential ηˆi). The results from estimating the model with this outlier-corrected sample
are presented in column (1) of Table 7. The sample size is reduced to 11, 045 observations but
the coefficients remain very stable for the bottom-ranked occupation and increase slightly in size
for the top-ranked occupation. Additionally, both coefficients are again highly significant, which
indicates that our previous results were not driven solely by some outliers.
In columns (2)-(4) of Table 7, we focus on the robustness of our estimates against excluding
specific countries and years from the sample. The motivation for this is that there are some coun-
tries that have witnessed important structural changes during this period. This is especially the
case for the Eastern European countries of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, who joined
the European Union (EU) in 2004. In the process of their EU accession, these countries have imple-
mented a wide range of new policies. Moreover, these three countries started with rather low initial
EPS levels and have since experienced the most substantial average increases in environmental pol-
icy stringency over the sample period (see Figure 2). If, however, general legal and institutional
changes in these countries were the actual drivers of heterogeneous employment changes, our re-
sults could be biased. Therefore, we re-estimate our baseline IV-model once more, but we exclude
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech republic from the sample. Column (2) of Table 7 presents the
results. We observe a similar trend as in our previous robustness checks: The coefficients on both
the top- and bottom-ranked occupations remain highly significant. For the bottom-ranked occu-
pation, the coefficient remains very stable, while the coefficient for the top-ranked occupation has
increased slightly. This somehow confirms that our estimates are not driven by structural changes
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Table 6: Impact of Environmental Policy: Sub-periods (IV Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2005-2010 1999-2004 1992-1998 full sample
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.219∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗ −0.136 −0.189∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.082) (0.345) (0.039)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.330∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗ 0.379 0.462∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.088) (0.193) (0.903) (0.093)
Country fixed effects X X X X
Country time trends X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X X X
Observations 4,116 4,115 2,892 11,123
R2 0.200 0.031 0.106 0.112
Adjusted R2 0.029 −0.176 −0.183 0.049
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The
dependent variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. The regression model in all columns
includes fixed effects for country-specific occupations, year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and
a set of control variables. More specifically, the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports
plus imports over GDP and the logged patent stock invented by domestic residents control for the business
cycle as well as trends in trade and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following
variables: The working age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force
participation rate, the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. Moreover,
the trade and technology control variables are additionally interacted with the green potential measure ηˆi,
which provides two additional control variables on the occupation level. Lastly, the model incorporates a
linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of
country-specific occupations and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients
are indicated as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
induced on Eastern European countries by their EU accession. A similar bias could have occurred
as a result of the introduction of the Euro in 2002. Especially in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain - the so-called GIIPS countries - this has led to significant macroeconomic adjustment
processes (e.g. Lane, 2012; Eichengreen, 2010). In our baseline regression in column (3) of Table
4 we control for this potential bias by including year dummies, general economic trends, as well
as country-level linear time trends. If, however, such trends resulting from the introduction of the
Euro have had heterogeneous effects on occupational labor demand, our results could be driven
by the GIIPS countries only. Thus, we exclude these countries from our sample and re-estimate
our model. This drastically reduces the sample size to 7, 304 observations and changes the size of
the coefficients. Nevertheless, both coefficients remain highly significant, their sign is unchanged
and the 90% confidence intervals overlap with our baseline IV results. Thus, we rule out that the
introduction of the Euro and its induced structural change in some specific countries are driving
our previous results.
Lastly, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results against excluding the years of the so-called
Great Recession in 2008 and 2009. The common shock to occupational demand, which occurred in
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Table 7: Impact of Environmental Policy: Excluding Potential Outliers (IV Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exclude Top exclude CZ, exclude GIIPS exclude Great
0.5% SK, HU countries Recession
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.209∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.525∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.102) (0.103) (0.087) (0.093)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Country time trends X X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X X X
Observations 11,045 9,721 7,304 9,751
R2 0.113 0.118 0.088 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.057 0.019 0.049
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. The regression model in all columns includes fixed effects
for country-specific occupations, year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and a set of control variables. More
specifically, the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the logged patent
stock invented by domestic residents control for the business cycle as well as trends in trade and technology. Demographic
and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and
older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate, the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing
employment. Moreover, the trade and technology control variables are additionally interacted with the green potential
measure ηˆi, which provides two additional control variables on the occupation level. Lastly, the model incorporates a
linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of country-specific
occupations and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
response to the global financial crisis, is controlled for by year dummies in our baseline estimation.
However, the shock from the Great Recession has likely been heterogeneous between countries and
occupations and could be insufficiently captured by the country-level time trends included in our
models. Thus, we exclude the years 2008 and 2009 from our sample and re-estimate the baseline
model in column (4). The results from this estimation remain practically identical to the baseline
estimates presented in column (3) of Table 4. This indicates that a potentially heterogeneous
impact of the Great Recession is captured well in our baseline IV model. To summarize, the
results from Table 7 suggest that the observed relationship between environmental regulation
and employment remains stable if potential outliers, specific countries or years are excluded from
the sample. These findings indicate that our baseline IV estimates are unbiased with respect to
potential outliers and are not driven by structural shocks in specific countries.
As a last check to the sensitivity of our baseline IV estimates, we examine potential measure-
ment error in our main explanatory variable. Our explanatory variable of interest is the country-
level EPS index developed by the OECD. It is a composite indicator, constructed as the average of
a broad range of policies and is aggregated at the country level. Thus, it is possible that it is driven
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by specific policies that might not matter for our analysis to some extent. To control for this, we
re-estimate our model from Equation (3) using an alternative measure for environmental policy
stringency rather than the EPS. Instead, we calculate the amount of total expenditure on pollution
taxes (in USD) per ton of pollution in CO2 equivalents. The data for this measure is obtained
from Eurostat and it can be interpreted as an approximation of a county-level implicit pollution
tax. As before, we instrument the domestic implicit pollution tax with the average foreign implicit
pollution tax to account for potential simultaneity. Regression results using this measure as the
explanatory variable of interest are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Impact of the Implicit Pollution Tax on Employment (IV Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Implicit Pollution Taxj,t−1 −0.050∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.041∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.022) (0.004)
Implicit Pollution Taxj,t−1 × 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.085
Green Potential ηˆi (0.019) (0.019) (0.056)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X
Country time trends X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X
Observations 4,250 4,180 4,180 4,180
R2 0.084 0.102 0.117 0.126
Adjusted R2 −0.103 −0.087 −0.072 −0.061
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010.
The dependent variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. All model specifications
include fixed effects for country-specific occupations. Columns (2) to (4) further include year dummies,
country-specific linear time trends and a set of control variables. More specifically, columns (2) to (4)
include the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the
logged patent stock invented by domestic residents to control for the business cycle as well as trends in
trade and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working
age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate,
the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. In columns (3) and (4)
the trade and technology control variables from column (2) are additionally interacted with the green
potential measure ηˆi, thereby constructing two new controls on the occupation level. Moreover, columns
(3) and (4) incorporate a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of country-specific occupations (721 country-specific ISCO 3-digit occupations)
and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The coefficients show the estimated change of occupational employment for the bottom- and
top-ranked green potential occupation following a 1$ increase in the implicit pollution tax.24 Due
24The mean of country-level averages of the implicit pollution tax is 28.2$ per ton of CO2 equivalents. That is,
a change of the implicit pollution tax by 1$ is a rather small increase.
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to limited availability of data for pollution in CO2 equivalents, our estimation sample shrinks to
4, 250 observations in column (1). Nevertheless, both coefficients on the top- and bottom-ranked
green potential occupation are again highly significant and have the same direction as our IV
results using the EPS index. This is also the case when we add control variables to reduce threats
of omitted variable bias in column (2). In column (3) we incorporate further covariates in the
model, which control for occupation-specific effects from trade and technological trends. This
does not substantially alter the size of the coefficients, but yields standard errors approximately
three times larger compared to column (2). Although the coefficients in column (3) still have the
same direction compared to our baseline IV regression, the coefficient on the top-ranked green
potential occupation now becomes non-significant. The coefficient on the bottom-ranked green
potential occupation, in turn, remains significant on the 90% confidence level. In column (4), we
also report the regression result if we do not take the heterogeneity of occupations into account.
That is, we measure the average change in employment across occupations that is associated with
an increase in the implicit pollution tax. In this case, the coefficient on environmental policy
has the same direction compared to the baseline IV regression and is significant on the 90%
confidence level. Also, it is much smaller compared to the coefficient estimate in column (3). This
is reassuring because it implies that although the coefficient on the interaction term in column
(3) is not significant, the coefficient on the bottom-ranked occupation does not correspond to the
average effect. That is, heterogeneity is also present in the model specification of column (3), but
cannot be estimated precisely enough. In fact, the p-value of the coefficient on the top-ranked
occupation is 0.137, which is close to significance on the 10% confidence level. In sum, using an
alternative measure for environmental policy stringency rather than the EPS index results in the
same empirical relationship between environmental policy and occupational employment.
Implications of a Policy Shock
Having investigated the robustness of our findings, we now use our empirical results to illustrate
the implications of a specific environmental policy shock. Recall our baseline estimates from Table
4: Following an average change of environmental policy stringency by 0.131, our model would
predict an associated decrease of occupational employment by 2.5% for the bottom-ranked green
potential occupation, and an increase of 3.6% for the top-ranked green potential occupation. Since
the main contribution of our analysis is to provide insight on heterogeneous labor market responses,
we next examine employment changes over the full distribution of manufacturing occupations. For
an arbitrary occupation and a specific environmental policy shock (i.e. a specific EPS-change), we
can derive an employment response with corresponding standard error by using the green potential
measure ηˆi, the estimated regression coefficients βˆ1 and βˆ2, as well as the estimator covariance-
matrix from the baseline model specification in column (3) of Table 4. As before, we choose an
average EPS-change equal to ∆EPS.,. ∗EPS.,. = 0.069 ∗ 1.9 = 0.131 to illustrate the environmental
policy shock. Formally, we calculate occupational employment responses as:
∆ˆi = βˆ10.131 + βˆ2ηˆi0.131 (9)
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Figure 4 presents the predicted employment changes ∆ˆi for all occupations. More specifically,
it plots the predicted change of occupational employment ∆ˆi following an average EPS-increase
by 0.131 conditional on an occupation’s green potential ηˆi. The black dotted lines in Figure 4
state if predicted employment changes are significantly different from zero on the 90% significance
level.25 Further, the size of the bubbles indicates the average of occupational employment levels
across countries and over time, formally empi.,. .
Figure 4: Predicted Employment Changes Following an Environmental Policy Shock
Note: The graph plots the predicted employment response resulting from ∆EPS = 0.131. The size of the points
indicate mean occupational employment levels empi,.,., i.e. averaged over countries and time. Predictions outside
the area between the two black dotted lines are significantly different from zero on the 90% confidence level.
As previously discussed, the top- and bottom-ranked occupations are expected to experience
employment changes by 3.6% and −2.5%, respectively. These two occupations define the range of
the occupational employment response and are thus located in the upper right and lower left of
Figure 4. For the remaining occupations, predicted employment changes are mostly concentrated
between -2% and +2% and are distributed relatively uniformly over this spectrum. The two
highest ranked occupational groups are ”211 Physicists, chemists and related professionals” and
”214 Architects, engineers and related professionals”. Both groups are expected to experience by
far the largest employment changes when environmental policy stringency increases. After these
two, there is a group of occupations with green potential values ηˆi between 0.5 and 0.75, which
are expected to witness smaller but still positive employment changes, ranging from around 0.5%
to 2%.
This is somewhat different for occupations with negative predicted employment changes. In
25Significance levels can be obtained through calculating the variance of the predicted employment responses as
Var(∆ˆi) = (0.131)
2Var(βˆ1) + (0.131)2ηˆ2i Var(βˆ2) + 2(0.131)
2ηˆiCov(βˆ1, βˆ2)
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terms of their green potential, they are located more closely to each other: The spectrum of green
potential ranges from 0 to 0.3 only for these occupations (0.5 to 1 for occupations with positive
effects). Significant negative employment changes range from −2.5% to around −0.7%. In this
regard, it is worth mentioning that most of the occupations in this part of the green potential
distribution are from the ISCO major groups ”8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers”,
”9 Elementary occupations” and ”4 Clerical support workers”. This indicates that greening the
economy could harm occupations primarily performing support and elementary tasks, while, at
the same time, more technically-oriented occupations in manufacturing will likely benefit.
From Figure 4, one can immediately see that employment levels (i.e. the size of the bubbles)
are far from uniform across occupations. Therefore, absolute occupational employment changes
will vary between occupations. To get a sense of absolute occupational employment changes, we
turn to the absolute magnitude of the predicted employment response presented in Figure 4. We
use occupational employment levels from 2010 and plot predicted absolute employment changes
in Figure 5. For relatively many occupations the projected absolute employment changes tend to
be rather small and, accordingly, this is also the case for the aggregated net employment change.
This is consistent with previous findings in the literature, indicating that employment changes
are small or negligible on aggregate (e.g. Marin and Vona, 2019; Vona et al., 2018). Among the
occupations with positive employment changes, it is striking that the occupation ”214 Architects,
engineers and related professionals” account for 30% of the total employment increase. In contrast,
occupational employment losses are distributed much more evenly. Here, the occupation with the
largest absolute employment decrease (”932 Manufacturing labourers”) contributes only 14% to
the total employment decrease.
This implies that, on aggregate, the occupational structure primarily determines whether ag-
gregate employment changes are positive or negative. Clearly, the occupational structure in the
manufacturing sector differs between countries. Therefore, aggregate employment changes will
also be heterogeneous between European countries and there will be winners and losers. In order
to analyze this further, we also calculate the country-level employment response resulting from
an EPS-change of 0.131. To derive these figures, we use Equation (9): For country j, the net
employment response from increased environmental policy stringency is defined as the sum of all
absolute occupation-level employment changes in that country:
∆ˆj =
N∑
i=1
∆ˆiLij (10)
In Figure 6 we use occupational employment levels Lij from 2010 and state relative country-level
employment changes associated with an average environmental policy shock.26
This clearly shows varying employment changes across countries. The reason for this is that
occupational patterns of national manufacturing sectors are important. In other words, countries
26Figure 6 also states confidence intervals for the predicted employment responses. In order to construct these,
we have to assume independence across occupational employment responses. In other words, in country j, the
predicted change of occupation ISCO1j is unrelated to the predicted change of occupation ISCO2j . With this,
significance levels and confidence intervals can again be obtained through calculating the variance of the predicted
aggregate employment responses as Var(∆ˆj) =
∑N
i=1(Lij)
2Var(∆ˆi)
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Figure 5: Predicted Absolute Employment Changes Following an Environmental Policy Shock
Note: The graph plots the predicted absolute employment change (in thousand workers) resulting from
∆EPS = 0.131. Predictions are based on 2010 employment figures. The size of the bubbles indicate employment
levels in 2010.
whose manufacturing sector employed a relatively large number of occupations with high green
potential in 2010, were much more likely to experience net employment gains if environmental
policy stringency has increased. According to our illustrative example, this would be the case for
primarily the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland, as well as the
UK and Ireland. Our illustrative example suggests that a shock to the EPS by 0.131 fosters net
manufacturing employment in these countries in the range of 0.2% − 0.55%. A second group of
countries could be more or less unaffected by more stringent regulations. This group is composed
of the Eastern European countries of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, together with
Austria and the Netherlands. For these countries, the aggregate net employment responses range
from slightly negative but close to 0% to a maximum of +0.2%. Lastly, there is a group consisting
of Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. These four Southern European countries would most likely be
negatively affected by increased environmental policies. Their aggregate net employment response
ranges from 0% to around 0.45% and is most clearly negative for Greece and Portugal.
6 Conclusion
Since the end of the 1990s, the stringency of environmental policies has steadily increased in
many developed countries. For the U.S., there are several studies investigating potential effects
on productivity and the labor market from this ongoing regulatory trend. At the same time,
empirical evidence for European countries is–with a few exceptions (e.g. Marin and Vona, 2019)–
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Figure 6: Predicted Aggregate Employment Changes Following an Environmental Policy Shock
Note: The graph plots the predicted aggregate employment changes from ∆EPS = 0.131. The employment
changes are based on occupational employment figures from 2010. The vertical error bars show 90% confidence
intervals for the estimated employment changes.
rather scarce.
Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways: First, it presents a data-driven approach
to predict the green potential of ISCO occupations. Second, it uses this information to investigate
the relationship between environmental regulations and occupation-level employment in European
manufacturing sectors. In particular, we combine panel data from the OECD and Eurostat for the
years 1992-2010 to estimate a fixed effects model using an instrumental variable approach. We cap-
ture environmental policy stringency by using the EPS index developed at the OECD (see Botta
and Koz´luk, 2014). As this measure aggregates a wide range of environmental policies, our regres-
sion estimates highlight employment responses of the overall green regulatory stringency. Stated
differently, our paper does not analyze the effect of a single and very specific policy intervention.
Our empirical results are robust against several robustness checks and suggest the following:
Increased environmental policy stringency negatively affects occupations with low green poten-
tial, while it is positively associated with employment in occupations with high green potential.
Moreover, we find that average manufacturing employment across occupations remains unaffected
by environmental policies. All of these results are consistent with Vona et al. (2018), who find
the same patterns for the U.S.. Furthermore, our findings are also in line with the results from
Marin and Vona (2019) for European labor markets, although we focus on a more granular oc-
cupational level and use a different empirical framework. Thus, our analysis complements these
papers and adds additional empirical insights on the importance of heterogeneous labor market
responses resulting from greening.
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We also illustrate the implications of our findings in response to a specific shock to the stringency
of green regulations. According to our estimates, an average increase in the OECD’s EPS index
results in occupational employment responses ranging from −2.5% to +3.6%. That is to say,
we find substantial heterogeneity between occupations. Accordingly, there are winners and losers
among manufacturing workers. To be more specific, our estimates suggest that science, engineering
and technical occupations are expected to benefit from greening, while elementary occupations
and clerical support workers could lose. Furthermore, since occupational patterns differ between
countries, heterogeneous net employment responses also translate to the country-level. In other
words, whether a country benefits or loses from a green transition and its inherent policy changes
depends largely on the occupational structure of the country. At least in the short term, a green
transition could thus also create winners and losers across countries. Taken together, our analysis
provides insight into the distributional consequences of greening the economy. Such distributional
effects are especially relevant from a political economy perspective, as they could provide a starting
point to explain public opposition against more stringent environmental regulations from unions,
industries, regions and even countries. In fact, some studies focusing on greening at the more
regional level have recently emerged (e.g. Santoalha and Boschma, 2020; Barbieri and Consoli,
2019; Bohlmann et al., 2019) and we consider this an interesting direction for future research.
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Computational Details
Our empirical results were obtained using R (version 3.6.1) (see R Core Team, 2019). We have
trained the Ridge regression algorithm using the package glmnet (Simon et al., 2011). All subse-
quent fixed effects regressions were estimated with the package plm (Millo, 2017; Croissant et al.,
2008). Moreover, for data processing and data visualization we have relied mainly on the packages
dplyr (Wickham et al., 2018) and ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016).
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A Appendix
A.1 Transferring Skills from O*NET to ISCO
In the following, we explain in detail the transfer of skills from 8-digit O*NET to ISCO-88. There
exist official crosswalks between the 6-digit SOC and 4-digit ISCO-08 classification system provided,
for example, by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). However, O*NET occupations are
classified according to the US 8-digit SOC code. So the first thing we have to do is to transfer
the skills from 8-digit to 6-digit SOC. In order to achieve this, we follow the literature (Bowen
et al., 2018; Vona et al., 2018; Consoli et al., 2016) and take simple (unweighted) averages of each
skill value s of all 8-digit O*NET occupations belonging to a 6-digit SOC occupation. In the
next step, we use the existing crosswalk between the 6-digit US SOC and the 4-digit ISCO-08 to
transfer each skill value s from SOC to ISCO-08. There are multiple matches on both sides, i.e.,
several SOC occupations are matched to an ISCO-08 occupation and vice versa. To deal with this,
we follow again the literature (OECD, 2017; Goos et al., 2014) and transfer the value of a skill
s from 6-digit SOC to 4-digit ISCO-08 by using a simple (unweighted) average among multiple
matches. Applying this transformation, we end up with a value for each skill s for all occupations
for which a cross-walk between 6-digit SOC and 4-digit ISCO-08 exists. The correlation of skill
values of 6-digit SOC occupations that match with the same 4-digit ISCO-08 occupation is on
average 0.958 and the standard deviation, 0.052. The high correlation indicates very similar skill
values between multiple matches. Thus, using simple averages to transfer skills from 6-digit SOC
to 4-digit ISCO-08 seems a valid approach to deal with multiple matches.
From this point on, there are a few more steps to go. Since our employment data from the
European Union Labour Force Survey (ELFS) is only available at a 3-digit level, we have to
aggregate the skill values from 4-digit to the 3-digit ISCO-08 level. To achieve this, we again take
simple (unweighted) averages of each skill value s of all 4-digit ISCO-08 occupations belonging to
a 3-digit ISCO-08 occupation. As in the case of SOC-occupations, each 4-digit occupation belongs
to exactly one 3-digit ISCO-08 occupation. Finally, we have to transfer the skills from 3-digit
ISCO-08 to 3-digit ISCO-88. Again, there are multiple matches in both directions. Thus, as in
the previous steps, we take simple (unweighted) averages. Finally, we end up with having a value
for all 114 O*NET skills for each of the 3-digit ISCO-88 occupations.
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A.2 Tables
Table 9: Estimated Green Potential of all 3-digit ISCO-88 Occupations.
ISCO-88 Occupation Estimated green potential
122 Production and operations managers 0.64
123 Other specialist managers 0.65
211 Physicists, chemists and related professionals 1.00
213 Computing professionals 0.47
214 Architects, engineers and related professionals 0.96
221 Life science professionals 0.52
235 Other teaching professionals 0.09
241 Business professionals 0.44
244 Social science and related professionals 0.23
245 Writers and creative or performing artists 0.25
311 Physical and engineering science technicians 0.54
312 Computer associate professionals 0.53
315 Safety and quality inspectors 0.45
321 Life science technicians and related associate professional 0.51
322 Health associate professionals (except nursing) 0.15
341 Finance and sales associate professionals 0.41
342 Business services agents and trade brokers 0.52
343 Administrative associate professionals 0.21
347 Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals 0.34
411 Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks 0.01
412 Numerical clerks 0.13
413 Material-recording and transport clerks 0.28
414 Library, mail and related clerks 0.08
422 Client information clerks 0.00
512 Housekeeping and restaurant services workers 0.20
516 Protective services workers 0.26
522 Shop, stall and market salespersons and demonstrators 0.41
611 Market gardeners and crop growers 0.45
711 Miners, shotfirers, stone cutters and carvers 0.72
712 Building frame and related trades workers 0.77
713 Building finishers and related trades workers 0.57
714 Painters, building structure cleaners and related trades workers 0.45
721 Metal moulders, welders, sheet-metal workers, structural-metal
preparers, and related trades workers
0.41
722 Blacksmiths, tool-makers and related trades workers 0.38
723 Machinery mechanics and fitters 0.66
724 Electrical and electronic equipment mechanics and fitters 0.64
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731 Precision workers in metal and related materials 0.33
732 Potters, glass-makers and related trades workers 0.41
733 Handicraft workers in wood, textile, leather and related mate-
rials
0.38
734 Craft printing and related trades workers 0.28
741 Food processing and related trades workers 0.22
742 Wood treaters, cabinet-makers and related trades workers 0.32
743 Textile, garment and related trades workers 0.26
744 Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades workers 0.20
812 Metal-processing plant operators 0.36
813 Glass, ceramics and related plant operators 0.30
814 Wood-processing- and papermaking-plant operators 0.30
815 Chemical-processing-plant operators 0.34
816 Power-production and related plant operators 0.39
821 Metal- and mineral-products machine operators 0.40
822 Chemical-products machine operators 0.30
823 Rubber- and plastic-products machine operators 0.19
824 Wood-products machine operators 0.26
825 Printing-, binding- and paper-products machine operators 0.20
826 Textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators 0.18
827 Food and related products machine operators 0.25
828 Assemblers 0.65
829 Other machine operators not elsewhere classified 0.48
832 Motor vehicle drivers 0.21
833 Agricultural and other mobile plant operators 0.40
911 Street vendors and related workers 0.20
913 Domestic and related helpers, cleaners and launderers 0.14
915 Messengers, porters, doorkeepers and related workers 0.18
932 Manufacturing labourers 0.17
933 Transport labourers and freight handlers 0.22
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Table 10: Summary Statistics of the EPS Index
average change
ISO N Mean Std.Dev. Max Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) last year 1st year (∆epsj,. × 100)
AT 16 2.41 0.506 3.33 1.85 1.94 2.83 2010 1995 3.7
BE 18 1.46 0.766 2.6 0.77 0.77 2.3 2010 1993 7.4
CH 15 2.23 0.472 3.33 1.69 1.94 2.25 2010 1996 3.5
CZ 14 1.75 0.907 2.89 0.69 0.83 2.68 2010 1997 11.7
DE 19 2.35 0.469 3.06 1.81 1.94 2.67 2010 1992 2.7
DK 19 2.62 0.632 4.07 1.98 2.12 2.9 2010 1992 3.6
ES 19 2.12 0.666 3.0 0.96 1.56 2.74 2010 1992 6.0
FI 14 2.33 0.701 3.25 1.35 1.65 3.02 2010 1997 4.7
FR 19 1.83 0.963 3.69 0.71 1.19 2.79 2010 1992 8.6
GR 19 1.68 0.341 2.33 0.77 1.6 1.83 2010 1992 6.3
HU 15 1.77 0.908 2.77 0.52 0.71 2.57 2010 1996 12.7
IE 19 1.21 0.641 2.23 0.52 0.73 1.8 2010 1992 8.4
IT 19 1.82 0.546 2.84 1.35 1.48 2.28 2010 1992 3.9
NL 19 2.05 0.905 4.13 1.17 1.31 2.72 2010 1992 7.3
NO 15 1.71 0.744 3.19 1.02 1.08 2.09 2010 1996 8.5
PT 19 1.68 0.662 2.71 1.02 1.06 2.24 2010 1992 5.0
SE 14 2.38 0.741 3.34 1.04 2.08 2.88 2010 1997 8.7
SK 13 1.37 0.559 2.39 0.67 1.06 1.78 2010 1998 10.9
UK 19 1.49 0.819 3.62 0.81 0.81 2.09 2010 1992 7.7
Note: The data is from the OECD. The average growth rate ∆epsj,. is calculated as the geometric mean of annual EPS changes. The
obtained value is multiplied by 100 to obtain percentage changes.
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Table 11: Number of 3-digit ISCO
Occupations per Country
ISO N last year 1st year
AT 41 2010 1995
BE 24 2010 1993
CH 26 2010 1996
CZ 54 2010 1997
DE 41 2010 1992
DK 21 2010 1992
ES 48 2010 1992
FI 29 2010 1997
FR 45 2010 1992
GR 40 2010 1992
HU 50 2010 1996
IE 44 2010 1992
IT 50 2010 1992
NL 44 2010 1992
NO 23 2010 1996
PT 36 2010 1992
SE 31 2010 1997
SK 35 2010 1998
UK 39 2010 1992
Notes: Data is obtained from Eurostat for
19 European countries. N gives the num-
ber of occupations per country, which are
considered in the regressions. Furthermore,
the last two columns state the latest and the
first year with employment figures available
for occupations from that country.
Table 12: Summary Statistics of Country-Level Control Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Unemployment rate 324 7.99 3.87 2.26 5.01 9.66 24.17
log(patent stock) 324 7.65 1.55 3.38 6.63 8.68 10.95
log(trade openness) 324 4.35 0.41 3.56 3.99 4.71 5.24
Working age to pension age ratio 311 4.31 0.59 3.14 3.94 4.49 6.41
Female labor force participation rate 324 63.05 9.42 41.71 56.46 70.24 78.17
log(manufacturing employment) 324 13.71 1.07 11.86 12.98 14.76 15.97
log(total population) 324 16.47 0.99 15.08 15.77 17.59 18.23
Notes: The data on the unemployment rate, patent stocks, trade openness, working age to pension age ratio and the female
labor force participation rate are all obtained from the OECD database. Data on manufacturing employment and total
population is calculated using the ELFS from Eurostat.
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Table 13: The Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Employment (Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
environmental policyj,t−1 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.015)
environmental policyj,t−1 × green potential ηˆi 0.391∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.057) (0.065)
unemployment ratej,t−1 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log(patent stockj,t−1) −0.170∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.064) (0.063)
log(trade opennessj,t−1) 0.157∗ −0.034 −0.212
(0.082) (0.132) (0.135)
age structurej,t−1 −0.007 −0.008 −0.014
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090)
female labor force participation ratej,t−1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
log(manufacturing employmentj,t−1) 0.385∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
log(total populationj,t−1) −0.405 −0.435 −0.457
(1.168) (1.158) (1.170)
log(patent stockj,t−1) × green potential ηˆi 0.144 0.317∗∗
(0.146) (0.145)
log(trade opennessj,t−1) × green potential ηˆi 0.511∗ 0.994∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.290)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X
Country time trends X X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X
Observations 11,543 11,123 11,123 11,123
R2 0.046 0.072 0.113 0.105
Adjusted R2 −0.018 0.007 0.050 0.041
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. All model specifications include fixed effects for
country-specific occupations. Columns (2) to (4) also include year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and
a set of control variables. The controls consist of the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus
imports over GDP, the logged patent stock invented by domestic residents, the ratio between the population share of the
working age population (16-65 years old) to pensioners (65+ years old), the female labor force participation rate as well
as the log of total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. In columns (3) and (4) we additionally
interact the trade and technology control variables with the green potential measure ηˆi, thereby constructing two new
controls on the occupation level. Moreover, columns (3) and (4) also include a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO
level. Standard errors are clustered at country-specific occupations (721 country-specific ISCO 3-digit occupations) and
are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 14: Instrument Relevance: G7 Member Countries Excluded (Fixed
Effects)
Dependent variable:
Domestic environmental policy
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign environmental policy 0.831∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.141) (0.144)
Country fixed effects X X X
Time trend X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X
Demographic & sector controls X
Weak instrument Wald test (F-Value) 33.0 24.1 28.6
Observations 267 267 254
R2 0.805 0.825 0.832
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.811 0.815
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 15 European countries between
1992 and 2010. Germany, France, Italy and the UK are excluded from the sample as
members of the G7. The dependent variable in all columns is the domestic environmental
policy stringency index. All model specifications include fixed effects for 19 countries and
a common linear time trend. Columns (2) and (3) also include a set of control variables.
Business cycle, trade and technology controls consist of the national unemployment rate,
the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the logged patent stock invented
by domestic residents. Demographic and sector controls include the following: First,
the ratio between the population share of the working age population (16-65 years old)
to pensioners (65+ years old), then the female labor force participation rate as well
as the log of the national population and the log of total manufacturing employment.
Standard errors are clustered at country-level (19 countries) and are robust against
heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 15: The Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Employment (IV Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
environmental policyj,t−1 −0.292∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.033) (0.030) (0.039) (0.015)
environmental policyj,t−1 × green potential ηˆi 0.460∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067) (0.093)
unemployment ratej,t−1 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
log(patent stockj,t−1) −0.171∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.067) (0.063)
log(trade opennessj,t−1) 0.157∗ 0.034 −0.212
(0.082) (0.135) (0.135)
age structurej,t−1 −0.006 −0.006 −0.014
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090)
female labor force participation ratej,t−1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
log(manufacturing employmentj,t−1) 0.383∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
log(total populationj,t−1) −0.398 −0.425 −0.454
(1.168) (1.154) (1.170)
log(patent stockj,t−1) × green potential ηˆi 0.078 0.317∗∗
(0.153) (0.145)
log(trade opennessj,t−1) × green potential ηˆi 0.329 0.994∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.290)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X
Country time trends X X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X
Observations 11,543 11,123 11,123 11,123
R2 0.045 0.071 0.112 0.105
Adjusted R2 −0.018 0.006 0.049 0.041
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. All model specifications include fixed effects for
country-specific occupations. Columns (2) to (4) also include year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and
a set of control variables. The controls consist of the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus
imports over GDP, the logged patent stock invented by domestic residents, the ratio between the population share of the
working age population (16-65 years old) to pensioners (65+ years old), the female labor force participation rate as well
as the log of total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. In columns (3) and (4) we additionally
interact the trade and technology control variables with the green potential measure ηˆi, thereby constructing two new
controls on the occupation level. Moreover, columns (3) and (4) also include a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO
level. Standard errors are clustered at country-specific occupations (721 country-specific ISCO 3-digit occupations) and
are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 16: Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Employment (IV Fixed Effects):
G7 member countries excluded
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 −0.261∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ −0.016
(0.038) (0.033) (0.045) (0.018)
Environmental Policyj,t−1 × 0.422∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
Green Potential ηˆi (0.077) (0.074) (0.106)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X
Country time trends X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X
Observations 9,098 8,678 8,678 8,678
R2 0.033 0.064 0.109 0.101
Adjusted R2 −0.033 −0.004 0.043 0.034
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 15 European countries between 1992 and 2010.
The G7 member countries France, Germany, Italy and the UK are excluded from the sample. The
dependent variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. All model specifications include
fixed effects for country-specific occupations. Columns (2) to (4) further include year dummies, country-
specific linear time trends and a set of control variables. More specifically, columns (2) to (4) include
the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the logged
patent stock invented by domestic residents to control for the business cycle as well as trends in trade
and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working age
(16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate,
the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. In columns (3) and (4)
the trade and technology control variables from column (2) are additionally interacted with the green
potential measure ηˆi, thereby constructing two new controls on the occupation level. Moreover, columns
(3) and (4) incorporate a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the level of country-specific occupations (550 country-specific ISCO 3-digit occupations)
and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
45
Table 17: Impact of environmental policy stringency on employment (IV Fixed Effects)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
environmental policyj,t −0.157∗∗∗
(0.037)
environmental policyj,t−1 −0.189∗∗∗
(0.039)
environmental policyj,t−2 −0.155∗∗∗
(0.041)
environmental policyj,t+1 −0.150∗∗∗
(0.038)
environmental policyj,t × green potential ηˆi 0.436∗∗∗
(0.091)
environmental policyj,t−1 × green potential ηˆi 0.462∗∗∗
(0.093)
environmental policyj,t−2 × green potential ηˆi 0.523∗∗∗
(0.099)
environmental policyj,t+1 × green potential ηˆi 0.394∗∗∗
(0.090)
Occupation-country fixed effects X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Country time trends X X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X X
Demographic controls X X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X X X
1-digit ISCO time trends X X X X
Observations 11,807 11,123 10,438 11,120
R2 0.166 0.112 0.095 0.118
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.049 0.026 0.055
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. The regression model in all columns includes fixed effects
for country-specific occupations, year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and a set of control variables. More
specifically, the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports over GDP and the logged patent
stock invented by domestic residents control for the business cycle as well as trends in trade and technology. Demographic
and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and
older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate, the log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing
employment. Moreover, the trade and technology control variables are additionally interacted with the green potential
measure ηˆi, which provides two additional control variables on the occupation level. Lastly, the model incorporates a
linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of country-specific
occupations and are robust against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 18: Placebo Regression (Fixed Effects and IV Fixed Effects Estimations)
Dependent variable:
log(employmentijt)
(1) (2) (3)
placebo placebo green potential
(fixed effects) (IV fixed effects) (IV fixed effects)
Environmental policyj,t−1 −0.029 −0.026 −0.189∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.033) (0.039)
Environmental policyj,t−1 × 0.055 −0.044 0.462∗∗∗
green potential ηˆi (0.061) (0.079) (0.093)
Country fixed effects X X X
Country time trends X X X
Year dummies X X X
Business cycle, trade & technology X X X
Demographic & sector controls X X X
Trade & technology interactions X X X
ISCO time trends X X X
Observations 11,123 11,123 11,123
R2 0.094 0.094 0.112
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.029 0.049
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 19 European countries between 1992 and 2010. The
dependent variable in all columns is the log of occupational employment. The regression model in all columns
includes fixed effects for country-specific occupations, year dummies, country-specific linear time trends and a set
of control variables. More specifically, the national unemployment rate, the logged share of exports plus imports
over GDP and the logged patent stock invented by domestic residents control for the business cycle as well as
trends in trade and technology. Demographic and sector controls consist of the following variables: The working
age (16-64 years old) to pension age (65 years and older) ratio, the female labor force participation rate, the
log of the total population and the log of total manufacturing employment. Moreover, the trade and technology
control variables are additionally interacted with the green potential measure ηˆi, which provides two additional
control variables on the occupation level. Lastly, the model incorporates a linear time trend on the 1-digit ISCO
level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of country-specific occupations and are robust
against heteroskedasticity. Significance levels for the coefficients are indicated as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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